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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I examine high-income country motives for restricting immigration.  Abundant 
evidence suggests that allowing labor to move from low-income to high-income countries would 
yield substantial gains in global income.  Yet, most high-income countries impose strict limits on 
labor inflows and set their admission policies unilaterally.  A core principle underlying the 
World Trade Organization is reciprocity in tariff setting.  When it comes to migration from poor 
to rich countries, however, labor flows are rarely bidirectional, making reciprocity moot and 
leaving labor importers with all the bargaining power.  One motivation for barriers to labor 
inflows is political pressure from groups that are hurt by immigration.  Raising immigration 
would depend on creating mechanisms to transfer income from those that immigration helps to 
those that it hurts.  Another motivation for immigration restrictions is that labor inflows from 
abroad may exacerbate distortions in an economy associated with redistributive tax and transfer 
policies.  Making immigration more attractive would require creating mechanisms that limit the 
negative fiscal impacts of labor inflows on natives.  Fiscal distortions create an incentive for 
receiving countries to screen immigrants according to their perceived economic impact.  For high 
skilled immigrants, screening can be based on educational degrees and professional credentials, 
which are relatively easy to observe.  For low skilled immigrants, illegal immigration represents 
an imperfect but increasingly common screening device.  For policy makers in labor-importing 
nations, the modest benefits freer immigration brings may simply not be worth the political 
hassle.  To induce high-income countries to lower border barriers, they need to get more out of 
the bargain. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 When economists discuss the rationale for global trade accords, they generally appeal to 
the benefits of free trade for global economic well being.  By agreeing to keep trade barriers 
against each other low, countries can achieve a higher level of welfare than they could by 
succumbing to the unilateral incentive to improve their terms of trade through the application of 
tariffs.  The belief that the world is better off with multilateral trade liberalization than a state of 
trade war is in part what sustains the world trading system in the face of political opposition from 
special interests. 
 No such logic guides the policies that govern international migration.  Most labor-
importing countries set their admission policies unilaterally, with high-income countries 
imposing strict limits on labor inflows.  While only a handful of countries impede emigration, 
allowing workers to leave in no way guarantees that they have a place to go.1  Many countries 
have negotiated bilateral agreements on labor movements – the Philippines through its Overseas 
Employment Administration manages agreements on temporary migration flows with a dozen 
countries (International Organization for Migration, 2003) and Spain has immigration 
agreements with at least seven countries (http://www.migrationpolicy.org/)2 – but meaningful 
migration accords are much more the exception than the rule.3  The closest source and 
destination countries have come to negotiating a multilateral deal on migration is Mode IV of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which addresses the temporary movement of 
“natural persons” in the provision of services across borders.4  While GATS has been in force 
                                                 
1 The right to emigrate is codified in international treaties.  The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
states that, “Everyone has a right to leave any country, including his own.” 
2 Spain has agreements on legal immigration with Ecuador, Colombia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, Nigeria, 
Poland, and Romania.  However, the country has had substantial illegal labor inflows from the non-European 
countries within this group (Jandl, 2003), leaving the practical importance of its bilateral migration agreements in 
question. 
3 While the OECD (2004) identifies the existence of 176 bilateral migration agreements, their practical affect 
appears to be limited.  Most agreements establish a framework for future migration flows rather than mechanisms 
for governing current flows.  The same OECD study recognizes that the vast majority of migration flows occur 
outside of negotiated arrangements. 
4 Migration under Mode IV results from a contract between a buyer in an importing country and a supplier in an 
exporting country, in circumstances where consummation of trade requires the presence of the supplier’s employees 
in the buyer’s location (e.g., trade in architectural services that requires the supplier to be present in the buyer’s 
country in order to oversee construction of a building).  Given the fixed costs involved in negotiating such contracts, 
they are likely to be limited to skilled labor.  Mode IV migration is distinct from migration under a guest worker 
program, in which an employer in an importing country directly hires a worker from an exporting country under a 
temporary contract. 
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since the implementation of the Uruguay Round in 1995, its importance for international 
migration is limited. Mode IV explicitly excludes open-ended labor contracts, making it relevant 
to only a subset of temporary labor flows (IOM/World Bank/WTO, 2004).  Further, government 
commitments under Mode IV remain vague and often subject to extensive restrictions, leaving 
them applicable primarily to either very short-term contractors or intra-company transferees, 
most of whom are highly skilled and whose movement is relatively unimpeded to begin with 
(Mamdouh, 2004).5  Today, the vast majority of labor flows between countries remain governed 
by policies that labor importing countries design, monitor, and enforce. 
 Were the outcome of the current system an efficient global allocation of labor, there 
would be little to grumble about.  But there is evidence that allowing labor to move from low-
income to high-income countries would yield substantial gains in global income.  Clemens, 
Montenegro and Pritchett (2008) report that for a sample of 42 developing countries the average 
gain to migrating to the United States is an increase in annual earnings of about four times, at 
purchasing power parity.  For individuals with a secondary school education this amounts to an 
annual increase in income of around $10,000 (Hanson, 2008).  Rosenzweig (2007) estimates 
slightly larger benefits from migrating to the United States, among individuals that obtain a U.S. 
green card.6  These gains, which I describe in more detail in section two, reflect enormous cross 
country differences in labor productivity, which three decades of economic liberalization by 
developing countries have been unable to erase.  If goods, capital, and technology cannot flow in 
sufficient quantities to raise poor country incomes to rich country levels, then the freer mobility 
of labor is an obvious corrective.  The only argument against labor mobility would be negative 
externalities associated with either the exodus of labor from sending countries or the arrival of 
labor in receiving countries (Docquier and Rapoport, 2008).  Given the magnitude of the 
apparent income gains from incremental migration, negative spillovers would have to be very 
large to justify restricting labor flows on global efficiency grounds.  While research on the issue 
is still at an early stage, there is as of yet no compelling evidence that spillovers of such 
magnitude exist, meaning that it would be hard to make an economic case against significantly 
increasing international migration. 
                                                 
5 The ultimate relevance of Mode IV may depend on the willingness of countries to broaden their commitments 
through the Doha Round negotiations, which remain stalled.  
6 There are few systematic estimates of gains to migration to high-income destinations other than the United States. 
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 With money seemingly left on the table, it is a puzzle why countries have not found a 
way to facilitate greater global labor mobility.  One question is why labor-importing countries 
continue to set immigration policies unilaterally.  The simple answer is that when it comes to 
migration from poor to rich countries importers have all the bargaining power.  A core principle 
underlying the World Trade Organization is reciprocity in tariff setting:  by allowing imports into 
their markets countries secure access to markets for their exports.  With international migration 
between low-income and high-income countries, labor flows are rarely bidirectional, making 
reciprocity moot.  Whereas migration from high-income to low-income countries accounts for 
only 3.5% of world flows, migration from low-income to high-income is 33.6% of the total (see 
Table 1).  The United States stands out for its importance as a destination.  The country is host to 
19.7% of all international migrants from low-income incomes and 49.5% of migrants from low-
income countries that reside in high-income countries.  Yet, the United States is the source 
country for just 1.2% of the world’s migrants.  Because cross-country differences in income are 
largely a result of variation in total factor productivity (rather than, say, differences in relative 
factor supplies), rich countries primarily import labor from poor countries and poor countries 
primarily export labor to rich countries (Grogger and Hanson, 2008).  The reciprocal market 
access that poor labor exporters can offer is of little value to labor rich importers, leaving them 
under minimal bilateral pressure to open their borders to poor country workers. 
 A more fundamental question is why, even without the lure of reciprocal market access, 
receiving countries do not choose to make their economies more open to foreign labor.  If global 
labor flows raise global income, shouldn’t receiving countries have an incentive to let foreign 
workers into their labor markets?  Is the problem that receiving countries do not gain from 
immigration or that political constraints restrict them from choosing more efficient immigration 
policies?  In this paper, I examine high-income country motives for restricting immigration and 
how the institutional framework for policy setting translates these motives into policy outcomes.  
Along the way I will also conjecture as to why migration policy choices in middle-income 
countries, such as Arab Gulf States, tend to differ from rich OECD countries and what this might 
say about the role of political regimes in shaping immigration policy. 
 4
 The focus of my discussion will be on immigration restrictions in high-income countries.7  
There are important intra-regional labor movements associated with seasonal labor supply, the 
disintegration of countries (as with the Former Soviet Union), dislocation from war or natural 
disasters (as in southern Africa), and economic crisis, which I will not discuss.8  Intra-regional 
flows among Former Soviet Union countries account for 14% of world migration, among Sub-
Saharan African countries account for 7% of world flows, and among South Asian countries 
account for 5.8% of world flows (see Table 1).  Adding in intra-regional migration in Southeast 
Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and migration between neighboring 
low and middle-income countries account for 32% of the world total.  These flows are clearly a 
significant component of global labor movements.  However, there is little research on cross-
border migration between low-income countries, making the topic difficult to address (Ratha and 
Shaw, 2007).  I leave these flows out of the discussion not because they are unimportant but 
because the literature is still nascent. 
One motivation for barriers to labor inflows is political pressure from groups that are hurt 
by immigration.  If workers opposed to immigration lobby more effectively than the business 
groups that tend to support immigration, policy makers may choose to set foreign labor inflows 
too low, at least from the perspective of maximizing national income.  Raising immigration 
would depend on creating a mechanism to transfer income from those that immigration helps to 
those that it hurts.  In section three, I discuss theoretical and empirical literature on the political 
economy of immigration policy. 
A related reason countries restrict immigration is that labor inflows from abroad may 
exacerbate distortions in an economy.  In the presence of redistributive tax and transfer policies, 
immigration, particularly if it is low skilled, may raise the net tax burden on native residents.  
Native voters may support immigration restrictions as a second best response to a welfare system 
that is hard to reform.  The key to making immigration more attractive is creating mechanisms 
                                                 
7 I define high income to include Australia, Japan, New Zealand; Canada, the United States; Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  See Table 1. 
8 There are sizable migration flows between many nearby countries, including from the former Soviet Republics to 
Russia and the Ukraine; Slovakia to the Czech Republic; Bosnia to Croatia; Poland to Bulgaria and the Ukraine; 
bidirectional flows between Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan; Afghanistan to Iran; Iraq to Syria; other Middle 
Eastern states to Saudi Arabia; Mali to Burkina Faso; other East African states to Cote d’Ivoire; other Southern 
African states to South Africa; China to Hong Kong; Indonesia and the Philippines to Malaysia; Malaysia to 
Singapore; Nicaragua to Costa Rica; and Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay to Argentina (Parson et al., 2007). 
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that limit the negative fiscal impacts of labor inflows on natives.  Interestingly, the tax argument 
on immigration can also work in favor of setting labor inflows too high.  With pay-as-you-go 
public pensions, older native workers may support the immigration of younger workers, in order 
to ensure the government has sufficient payroll tax revenues to make good on its obligations, 
regardless of the long-term fiscal implications of the labor inflows.  In section four, I discuss 
how the fiscal impacts of labor inflows affect immigration policy. 
Fiscal distortions create an incentive for receiving countries to screen immigrants 
according to their perceived economic impact.  For high skilled immigrants, screening can be 
based on educational degrees and professional credentials, which are relatively easy to observe.  
But for low skilled immigrants, screening is more problematic.  Their economic performance is 
based less on education than on motivation and ability, which are hard to verify in a visa 
application or a consular interview.  Having low skilled workers enter as illegal immigrants, as is 
increasingly the case not only in the United States but also in Europe, is a mechanism for 
selecting potential entrants who have a strong desire to work.  While illegal entry may help 
identify good workers, it has other properties that are unappealing, including exposing migrants 
to extreme physical risks, leaving immigrants in a state of prolonged uncertainty regarding their 
residency rights, and attracting criminal gangs into the business of migration.  In section four, I 
discuss why countries create separate policy regimes to govern legal and illegal immigration and 
identify mechanisms that could potentially replace illegal entry.  I also discuss reasons why non-
democratic countries tend to choose temporary legal immigration over illegal immigration and 
what this could say about the scope for expanding foreign guest worker programs in rich, 
democratic countries. 
 High-income countries maintain barriers to immigration not because of a lack of 
international cooperation but because they do not perceive significant benefits from greater labor 
inflows.  Ironically, the labor movements that make migrants substantially better off appear to 
have only modest effects on net incomes in receiving countries.  Borjas (1999) estimates that for 
the United States the net short run impact from immigration is a change in GDP of a few tenths 
of a percent, which given the uncertainties involved in making such a calculation is essentially a 
wash.  While one may quibble with some of the assumptions underlying his calculations, 
plausible alternative assumptions would not yield outcomes more than two or three times larger, 
which is still less than one percent of GDP.  For policy makers in labor-importing nations, the 
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modest benefits freer immigration may bring are simply not worth the political hassle.  To induce 
high-income countries to lower border barriers, they need to get more out of the bargain.  By 
way of conclusion, in section six I discuss policy reforms that could make receiving countries 
amenable to raising immigration from poor countries. 
 
2 INCOME GAINS FROM EMIGRATION 
 
How large are the gains in migrating from a low-income to a high-income country?  
Surprisingly, there is relatively little research on this question.  Before beginning the discussion 
of the political economy of immigration policy, I briefly describe results from recent attempts to 
quantify the gross gains to migration, most of which focus on the United States.  By gross gains, 
I mean ignoring the costs of migration, evidence on which is hard to come by.   
As an illustrative example, consider the income gain to migrating from Mexico to the 
United States.  The simplest way to evaluate the gain would be to compare average incomes in 
the two countries.  In 2000, per capita GDP in Mexico was $9,700, compared with $34,500 in the 
United States (in 2000 PPP adjusted dollars).  While the absolute income gain from leaving 
Mexico for the United States is surely large, it may be overstated by the difference in per capita 
income.  One issue is that workers in Mexico and the United States have different levels of 
education and labor market experience.  At the very least, one would want to compare incomes 
for individuals with similar observable characteristics.  Using data from U.S. and Mexico 
population censuses, Hanson (2006) reports that in 2000 the average hourly wage for a 28 to 32 
year old male with 9 to 11 years of education was $2.40 in Mexico and $8.70 for recent Mexican 
immigrants in the US.9  At full time labor supply (35 hours per week and 48 weeks per year) this 
would yield a yearly income gain of $10,600.  Combining household data in developing 
countries with data from the U.S. Census, Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) estimate 
that in 2000 the annual income gain to migration for a 35 year-old urban Mexican male with 9 to 
12 years of education was $9,200.  Simply by controlling for observable characteristics, the 
estimated gain to migration from Mexico to the United States falls from $25,000 to $10,000.   
Yet, migrants and non-migrants with similar education and experience may not be the 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, for Mexico the relative income gain appears similar (about four times) whether one looks at per 
capita GDP or hourly wages for low skilled labor.  For other developing countries, per capita GDP differences 
overstate the relative gain to migration.  See Clemens et al. (2008). 
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right comparison.  They may differ in terms of unobserved cognitive ability, motor skills, or 
motivation.  If migrants are positively selected on unobserved skill, the estimated $10,000 gain 
would overstate the benefits from emigration.  Using a range of econometric techniques, 
Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) attempt to control for self-selection on unobservables 
in migration, as well as for the possibility that the gains to migration include compensation for 
the cost of moving abroad.  They find that observed gains to migration overstate true gains by 
1.25 to 1.5 times.  For the Mexico-U.S. case, the gain to migration would fall from $10,000 to 
$6,700 to $8,000. 
A still better comparison would be to examine income for the same individual, before and 
after migration.  Rosenzweig (2007) uses data from the New Immigrant Survey to estimate the 
change in income for new U.S. permanent legal immigrants in 2003.  He compares their current 
U.S. earnings with their earnings in the last job they held in their country of origin, prior to 
migration.  For a legal immigrant from Mexico with 9 to 12 years of education, the average gain 
in income is $15,900 (again, at full time labor supply).  Comparing the same individuals in two 
countries corrects for selection on unobservables but may introduce other complications.  If 
preparing for migration causes an individual to lower his or her labor supply or accept a job with 
a low hourly wage, Rosenzweig’s estimates may overstate the gains to migration. 
An alternative way to gauge the income gain to migration would be to compare the 
incomes of two individuals from the same source country where one is randomly selected to 
migrate to a particular destination and the other is not.  McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2006) 
use data from New Zealand’s visa lottery to examine such an experiment.  They compare the 
income of lottery losers in Tonga (i.e., those who applied for the visa lottery and were rejected) 
with the incomes of lottery winners who migrated from Tonga in New Zealand.  The average 
increase in income is 263%, which is half as large as the difference in Tongan and New Zealand 
per capita GDP.  McKenzie et al. are also able to compare the incomes of lottery losers in Tonga 
with the incomes they expected to have earned if they had migrated.  Expected gains are only 
84%.  Relatively small expected gains may reflect informational asymmetries between domestic 
and foreign residents regarding labor market conditions abroad. 
The income gain from migration captures the gross return from moving to another 
country.  While there has been research on the role of migration networks in migration decisions, 
there is little work that estimates the actual cost of migration.  These costs include transport 
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expenses in moving abroad, time lost in switching labor markets, administrative fees incurred in 
legal migration, border crossing costs in illegal migration, the psychic costs of leaving home, and 
perceived changes in uncertainty associated with living and working in another country.  Given 
the absence of comprehensive data on migration costs, we are far from being able to produce 
reliable estimates of the change in net income resulting from emigration. 
 The change in income from emigration is the monetary gain from moving between 
countries.  Through remittances, this gain is shared between the migrant and his or her family 
members at home.  Remittances have increased markedly in East Asia and the Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  As of 2007, remittances 
exceeded official development assistance in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa and were 
greater than 65% of foreign direct investment inflows in all regions except Europe and Central 
Asia.  Among the smaller countries of Central America, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific, 
remittances account for a large share of national income, ranging from 10% to 17% of GDP in 
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, and 
representing an astounding 53% of GDP in Haiti (Acosta, Fajnzylber, and Lopez, 2007). 
 Having migrants abroad also provides insurance to households, helping them smooth 
consumption in response to income shocks, be they domestic or foreign.  Yang (2007) examines 
changes in remittances to households in the Philippines before and after the Asian financial 
crisis.  As of 1997, 6% of Philippine households had a member that had migrated abroad.  Some 
had gone to countries in the Middle East, whose currencies appreciated sharply against the 
Philippine peso in 1997-1998, while others had gone to East Asia, where currencies appreciated 
less sharply or even depreciated.  Consistent with consumption smoothing, remittances increased 
more for households whose migrants resided in countries that experienced stronger currency 
appreciation against the peso.  Yang also examines changes in household expenditure and labor 
supply.  Households with migrants in countries experiencing stronger currency appreciation vis-
à-vis the peso had larger increases in spending on child education, spending on durable goods, 
children’s school attendance, and entrepreneurial investments.  In these households, the labor 
supply of 10-17 year old children fell by more, particularly for boys.  These results suggest 
migration may help household overcome credit constraints on investment imposed by sending 
country financial markets. 
 For labor exporting countries, the costs and benefits from emigration tend to be highly 
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unequally distributed (Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2007).  Most of the gain is captured by migrants, a 
portion of which they share with their family members.  Non-migrating workers in sending 
countries may also gain, as wages rise in response to a reduction in labor supply (Mishra, 2007).  
Yet, labor exporting countries are likely to suffer a reduction in GDP, given the loss of labor 
resources.  If the emigrating labor is highly skilled, there may also be negative consequences for 
economic growth (which could be ameliorated by emigration’s positive effect on the incentive to 
acquire skills; Docquier and Rapoport, 2008).  The end result of emigration is that, at least in the 
short run, a relatively small number of individuals may enjoy a substantial gain while a relatively 
large number may experience a moderate loss.  For sending countries, emigration tends to 
increase GNP (which in theory includes income earned by migrants) but to decrease GDP 
(Hanson, 2008).  Here, then, is an important difference between trade and international 
migration.  While in theory trade raises the GDP of all countries, international migration only 
raises the GDP of receiving countries.  In theory, migration does raise GNP for all countries, but 
if sending countries lack the means to tax emigrants, the value of their lost labor services may 
not be offset by the value of the income they remit. 
 
 The gross income gain to migration appears to be large.  For a young male with some 
secondary education, Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) estimate the median annual 
gain from migrating to the United States to be $11,200 (after applying their correction for 
selection bias), while Rosenzweig estimates the annual gain to legal migration to the United 
States to be $10,600 (at full time labor supply).  The net gains to migration are unknown, 
however, given the absence of information about the magnitude of migration costs.  Remittances 
spread the income gains from migration to individuals in sending countries, allow households to 
smooth consumption in response to income shocks, and perhaps relax credit constraints on 
households.  Thus, while the net impact of migration on receiving countries appears to be small, 
for migrants and their family members in sending countries it is significant. 
 
3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 
 
 Why do countries restrict immigration?  Absent distortions, the first-best policy for a 
labor-importing country would be to have open borders.  Yet, most developed countries are far 
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from such a policy.  Immigration changes the distribution of income within a country, creating 
winners and losers.  In the United States, winners appear to include businesses that hire foreign 
labor, consumers that buy the goods and services that immigrants produce (Cortes, 2008), and 
land owners (Saiz, 2007); losers include low skilled native workers that compete with 
immigrants for jobs (Borjas, 2003) and taxpayers that absorb the fiscal costs of immigration 
(Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2008).  Evidence for Europe suggests that the labor market and 
fiscal consequences of immigration also contribute to opposition to foreign labor inflows 
(Mayda, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2008).   
By changing the income distribution, immigration has political consequences, which may 
give politicians an incentive to restrict labor inflows from abroad.  In choosing an immigration 
policy, a government trades off political support from special interests against consumer welfare, 
which tends to be enhanced by economic openness.  In a context where the median voter’s wages 
would be reduced by immigration, politicians may choose to restrict labor inflows in order to 
enhance their future electoral prospects (Benhabib, 1996; de Melo, Grether, and Müller, 2001).  
This logic does not appear to be very applicable to the United States or Europe, where 
immigrants are drawn disproportionately from either the bottom end or the top end of the skill 
distribution.  Workers in the middle of the skill distribution appear relatively unaffected by 
immigration, giving them little motivation for making the issue central to their voting behavior 
(Borjas, 2003).  Alternatively, governments may restrict immigration because they weigh the 
welfare of different individuals unequally, for whatever reason favoring those opposed to 
immigration (Foreman-Peck, 1992).  In the United States, fiscal conservatives have considerable 
political weight, given their prominence in the Republican Party.  Their opposition to 
immigration (in concert with cultural conservatives who also resist immigration) helped derail 
attempts to legalize illegal immigrants and expand visas for guest workers in 2007.  For fear of 
offending the party’s base, Republican presidential candidate John McCain, who had been a 
leading advocate for expanded immigration, gave the issue little attention in his 2008 campaign.  
In Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands, right wing parties 
have also been energized by immigration, allowing a core of anti-immigrant voters to have 
outsize influence in political outcomes. 
Lobbying by special interests may also influence immigration policy.  Facchini and 
Willmann (2005) extend the Grossman-Helpman model of the political economy of trade policy 
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to consider international factor mobility.  In their setup, governments restrict factor inflows from 
abroad through a per-factor unit tax or quota.  They assume that the receiving-country 
government captures factor tax revenues or quota rents, and that individuals are organized 
according to their factor type and lobby the government on immigration policy.  The first 
assumption appears to be counterfactual, as few governments collect significant payments from 
factor inflows.  The second assumption has more empirical support.  In the United States, 
periodic attempts to increase enforcement against illegal immigration are met with political 
opposition, particularly during periods when immigrant-intensive industries are booming 
(Hanson and Spilimbergo, 2001).  In equilibrium, each factor lobby offers the government 
campaign contributions to support stronger (weaker) restrictions on inflows of factors for which 
its members substitute (complement) in production.   
Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008) examine the allocation of foreign guest workers (in 
the form of H1B visas for skilled labor) across US industries and find that industries that spend 
more on lobbying the government on immigration succeed in obtaining a larger number of visas.  
Most H1B immigrants are in engineering, science or other technical fields, which have been in 
scare supply in the United States during the last two decades (Lowell, 2000).  Lobbying activities 
are evidence that skilled immigration benefits employers, consistent with standard economic 
theory that inflows of labor raise the marginal product of capital.  In theory, skill-intensive 
industries are the ones that gain most from skilled immigration, consistent with their aggressive 
in lobbying for visas (Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra, 2008).10  A substantial share of visas goes to 
high technology firms, with Cisco, Dell, Google, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, 
Motorola, Nokia, Oracle, Qualcomm, Siemens, Sprint, Sun, and Verizon being among the 
companies that sponsor the largest numbers of H1B visa holders.11  
For politicians to respond to pressure from voters regarding immigration policy, voters in 
destination countries must perceive that immigration affects their standard of living.  In the 
United States, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that opposition to immigration is stronger 
among less-educated workers, which appear to be the group most hurt by labor inflows from 
abroad (Borjas, 2003).  The opposition of the less-educated is greater in regions where immigrant 
                                                 
10 See also “Google, Oracle, and Microsoft Demand H1-B Remain a Source of Cheap Labor,” June 26, 2007, 
http://programmersguild.blogspot.com/2007/06/ microsoft-oracle-and-google-demand-that.html; and “Bill Gates: 
U.S. Senate Committee Hearing on Strengthening American Competitiveness,” March 7, 2007, 
http://www.microsoft.com/ Presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2007/03-07Senate.mspx. 
11 See http://www.myvisajobs.com/Visa-Job-Browse.aspx. 
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inflows have been larger.  Less-skilled labor’s skepticism about immigration mirrors its 
opposition to globalization more generally (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).  Mayda (2006) obtains 
similar results for a cross-section of European and Asian countries.  In economies where 
immigrants are less skilled than natives, opposition to immigration is stronger among less-skilled 
residents.  Still, one might be skeptical about the ability of low skilled labor to influence 
immigration policy.  Low income workers tend to have relatively low voter participation rates, 
giving politicians an incentive to discount their concerns.  Further, in some countries many low 
skilled workers are themselves first or second generation immigrants, who tend to be 
underrepresented in the political process. 
There is some evidence of organized labor lobbying against immigration, mirroring their 
opposition to international trade and globalization in general.  In the United States, labor unions 
helped convince Congress to terminate the Bracero Program, which allowed several hundred 
thousand foreign guest workers (mainly from Mexico) to work in U.S. agriculture each growing 
season from 1942 to 1965 (Calavita, 1992).  More recently, U.S. engineers have lobbied against 
the H1B visa program, though with limited success.  Organized labor’s opposition to the Bracero 
Program was consistent with its long-standing opposition to liberal immigration policies.  Over 
time, however, union opposition to immigration has weakened.  In the United States, first and 
second generation immigrants now constitute a rising share of union membership.  Perhaps out 
of fear of undermining their recruiting efforts, U.S. unions have removed opposition to 
immigration from their political platforms.  Labor unions, including the AFL-CIO, remain 
opposed to expanding guest worker programs, for fear that they weaken domestic labor 
standards, but has become less critical of permanent immigration. 
 
The impact of immigration on the distribution of income induces special interests to 
lobby governments on immigration policy.  Business groups tend to favor immigration and lobby 
to keep barriers low.  Labor groups tend to oppose immigration and lobby to keep barriers high.  
Were these the only forces affecting immigration policy, one would expect admission standards 
to be much more relaxed than they are now.  In the United States, organized labor has 
diminished political power and in recent decades has softened its opposition to immigration.  At 
least from the perspective of the wage impacts of immigration, one would expect policy makers 
to favor more sizable labor inflows.  That they do not suggests other factors also shape 
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immigration policy.  Next, I consider how the fiscal consequences of immigration affect policies 
governing labor inflows from abroad. 
 
4 FISCAL IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY 
 
Tax and transfer policies create another motivation for a labor-importing country to 
restrict immigration, even where the level of immigration is set by a social planner.  If 
immigrants are primarily individuals with low income relative to natives (which may be true 
even if migrants are high skilled relative to non-migrants in the source country), increased labor 
inflows may exacerbate distortions created by social-insurance programs or means-tested 
entitlement programs (Wellisch and Walz, 1998).  Such policies may make a departure from free 
immigration the constrained social optimum.  In the long run, immigrants may also affect voting 
outcomes directly through their participation in the political process, possibly leading to a further 
transfer of income away from native taxpayers (Razin, Sadka, and Swagel, 2002; Ortega, 2004). 
  In the United States, the fiscal consequences of immigration appear to matter for 
immigration policy preferences.  Low-skilled immigrants – who account for one-third of the U.S. 
foreign-born population – tend to earn relatively low wages, pay relatively little in taxes, and 
receive subsidized health care with relatively high frequency (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Fix and 
Passel, 2002).  Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) find that U.S. natives who are more 
exposed to immigrant fiscal pressures – those living in states that have large immigrant 
populations and that provide immigrants access to generous public benefits – are more in favor 
of reducing immigration.  This public-finance cleavage is strongest among natives with high 
earnings potential, who tend to be in higher tax brackets.  Facchini and Mayda (2008) obtain 
similar results for Europe, where immigrants also appear to be a fiscal drain (Sinn, Flaig, 
Werding, Munz and Hofmann, 2003).  More educated individuals, who are also likely to be high 
income earners, are more opposed to immigration in countries where immigrants are less skilled 
and governments are more generous in the benefits they provide. 
  There are also regional inequalities in the fiscal impacts of immigration.  These are 
particularly noticeable in the United States.  States and localities incur much of the fiscal cost 
associated with immigration, while the federal government receives much of the revenues 
(Hanson, 2006).  In the United States, states and localities pay for public education and public 
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health, with support from the federal government in the form of block grants.  About half of the 
value of public services that immigrants absorb is in the form of publication education, with 
health care occupying the second category.  Much of the tax revenues from immigration, in 
contrast, go to the federal government.  While sales taxes and property taxes are captured by 
states and localities, payroll taxes and federal income taxes would go to Washington, DC.  Illegal 
immigrants often have payroll taxes withheld because they present Social Security cards to 
employers (be they real or fake) as proof of employability.  By law, U.S. employers are required 
to ask for documents proving the eligibility of an individual for employment but they are not 
required to go to great efforts to verify the authenticity of these documents.  As part of an 
accepted fiction in employing illegal immigrants, employers deduct payroll taxes from their 
paychecks and pay these to the federal government.  Contributions maid on behalf of invalid 
Social Security accounts go into the Earnings Suspense Fund, which as of 2007 held $600 
billion.  Many illegal immigrants pay federal income taxes, as well, as this creates a paper trail of 
their earnings which is useful for obtaining home loans and car loans from banks. 
How large are the net fiscal consequences of immigration in actuality?  The truth is we do 
not really know.  The vast majority of studies, including the analyses of immigration and public 
pensions discussed below, are calibration exercises based on assumptions about future 
immigration and immigrant behavior.  One of the few comprehensive national level analyses of 
the fiscal impact of immigration was by the National Research Council (NRC), which conducted 
case studies on the states of New Jersey and California and for the United States as a whole 
(Smith and Edmonston, 1997).  In 2000, the share of the foreign-born in the adult population was 
34% in California, 24% percent in New Jersey, and 15% in the United States.  Interestingly, 
California and New Jersey states have immigrant populations with quite different skill profiles 
and patterns of welfare usage. In 2000, the share of immigrant households headed by someone 
with less than a high-school education was 34% in California and 29% in the nation as a whole, 
but only 23% in New Jersey. Similarly, the share of immigrant households receiving welfare 
benefits was 13% in California and 10% in the nation as a whole, but only 8% in New Jersey. 
These differences in welfare uptake are due in part to immigrants in California being less skilled 
and in part to California offering more generous benefits. 
Based on federal, state, and local government expenditures and tax receipts, the NRC 
estimated that the short-run fiscal impact of immigration was negative in both New Jersey and 
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California. In New Jersey, using data for 1989–1990, immigrant households received an average 
net fiscal transfer from natives of $1,500, or 3% of average state immigrant household income. 
Spread among the more numerous state native population, this amounted to an average net fiscal 
burden of $230 per native household, or 0.4% of average state native household income. In 
California, using data for 1994–95, immigrant households received an average net fiscal transfer 
of $3,500, or 9% of average immigrant household income, which resulted in an average fiscal 
burden on native households of $1,200, or 2% of average native household income. The impact 
of immigration on California is more negative because immigrant households in the state (a) are 
more numerous relative to the native population, (b) have more children, causing them to make 
greater use of public education, and (c) earn lower incomes, leading them to have lower tax 
payments and greater use of public assistance. 
For the entire United States, the NRC estimated that in 1996 immigration imposed a 
short-run fiscal burden on the average U.S. native household of $200, or 0.2% of U.S. GDP.12 In 
that year, the immigration surplus, as calculated by Borjas (1999), was 0.1% of GDP. A back of 
the envelope calculation then suggests that in the short run immigration in the mid-1990s 
reduced the annual income of U.S. residents by about 0.1% of GDP. Given the uncertainties 
involved in making this calculation, one should not put great stock in the fact that the resulting 
estimate is negative. All one can say is that the available evidence suggests the total impact is 
quite small. 
What about illegal immigrants?  Camarota (2004) applies the NRC methodology to 
estimate the fiscal impact of illegal immigration in the United States. He finds that in 2002 US 
illegal immigrants on net received $10 billion more in government benefits than they paid in 
taxes, a value equal to 0.1% of US GDP in that year. With unauthorized immigrants accounting 
for 5% of the US labor force, US residents would receive a surplus from illegal immigration of 
                                                 
12 Going from a short-run to a long-run estimate of the fiscal cost of immigration can change the results 
considerably. Immigrants are relatively young and far from their peak earning and taxpaying years. As immigrants 
age, their net fiscal contribution increases. Also, their children are likely to be more educated and to make greater 
tax contributions. The NRC estimates that the average immigrant admitted in 1990 would produce a net fiscal 
contribution of $80,000 over the next 300 years (in present discounted value terms), with the contribution depending 
on the individual’s skill level. The long-run fiscal contribution is negative for low-skilled immigrants (less than a 
high-school education) and positive for higher-skilled immigrants (more than a high-school education). Going 300 
years forward requires strong assumptions about the future economy. Even for the average immigrant, the annual net 
fiscal contribution is negative for the first twenty-five years after arriving in the United States. The long-run estimate 
assumes the federal government will ultimately raise taxes to bring the federal budget into balance. If this doesn’t 
happen, the long-run fiscal contribution of the average immigrant would be negative. 
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about 0.03% of GDP. Combining these two numbers, it appears that as of 2002 illegal 
immigration caused an annual income loss of 0.07% of US GDP. Again, given the uncertainties 
surrounding this sort of calculation, one could not say with much confidence that this impact is 
different from zero. 
Pay as you go pension systems create a further incentive for politicians to manipulate the 
timing and level of immigration (Scholten and Thum, 1996; Razin and Sadka, 1999; Poutvaara, 
2005).   Governments may choose to permit immigration of young workers, in order to smooth 
adjustment to demographic shocks, such as the aging of the baby boom generation (Auerbach 
and Oreopoulos, 1999; Storesletten, 2000).  Given its graying population and unfunded pension 
liabilities, one might expect Europe to be opening itself more aggressively to foreign labor 
inflows (Boeri, McCormick, and Hanson, 2002).  However, concerns over possible increases in 
expenditure on social insurance programs may temper the region’s enthusiasm for using 
immigration to solve its pension problems (Boeri and Brücker, 2005; De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 
2006).   
Analysis for Spain suggests that maintaining high levels of immigration would 
substantially reduce the net fiscal burden for future generations of natives, owing to the fact that 
in the absence of immigration plunging fertility would leave relatively small cohorts of future 
workers to finance the public pensions of relatively large cohorts of retired workers (Collado, 
Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Guadalupe Valera, 2004).  For Sweden, which has a strong welfare state, the 
net fiscal impact of immigration appears to depend crucially on the labor force participation rate 
for immigrant workers.  In a calibration exercise, Storesletten (2003) finds that if immigrant 
participation rates stay above 60% the net discounted economic impact of immigration is 
positive for natives in the country.  In the United States, where the fertility decline has been 
much less pronounced than in Spain, the long run fiscal impacts of immigration are much more 
sensitive to assumptions about future patterns of public spending (Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 
1999). 
Beyond the economic consequences of labor inflows, some argue that opposition to 
immigration is grounded in culture, with individuals preferring homogenous societies because 
they foster a stronger sense of national identity and civic purpose (Huntington, 2005).  Consistent 
with this claim, the recent anti-immigration-based presidential campaigns of Pauline Hanson in 
Australia, Jean Marie Le Pen in France, and Tom Tancredo and Duncan Hunter in the United 
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States each touted the negative cultural effects of foreign labor inflows.   Using individual survey 
data, Dustmann and Preston (2004) suggest that racist attitudes are an important component of 
opposition to immigration in the United Kingdom.  In a related vein, Hainmueller and Hiscox 
(2004) claim that greater tolerance for immigration among the college educated reflects 
cosmopolitan attitudes rather than economic concerns.   
Because fiscal conservatives and cultural conservatives are often aligned politically, it is 
difficult to disentangle how important cultural attitudes are in promoting resistance to 
immigration.  While opposing immigration in order to conserve cultural homogeneity may have 
appeal in Europe, Japan, or Korea, it is an odd case to make in the United States, given its long 
history of immigration by groups without a significant presence in the country.  Immigrants from 
Germany in the 18th century, Ireland in the 19th century, and Italy and Eastern Europe in the early 
20th century successfully assimilated into U.S. society.  Recent generations of Mexicans and 
Central Americans are assimilating at comparable speeds.  While cultural attitudes may present 
initial resistance to immigration, they may fade in importance with time.   
In Europe, the challenge of immigration from Islamic countries is contributing to cultural 
and ethnic tensions not seen for over a generation.13  Though empirical research is just emerging 
on the topic, there is evidence that Muslim immigrants in Europe are slow to assimilate and 
integrate into society (Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, and Zenou, 2008). One conjecture is that the 
slow pace of Muslim assimilation in Europe (relative to the United States) is not attributable to 
any particular features of the Muslim population but to rigid rules governing labor markets in 
Europe, which make economic progress difficult for new entrants (be they the young or the 
foreign born).   
 Tax and spending policies associated with the modern welfare state create an 
environment in which immigration from low income countries may exacerbate fiscal distortions.  
Where immigrants have relatively low income levels, as in the United States and Europe, welfare 
policies serve to transfer income from native households to immigrant households.  Adverse 
fiscal impacts from immigration for natives create political opposition to foreign labor inflows, 
which may be reinforced by regional disparities in who pays for the public services that 
immigrants consume.  Opposition to immigration may be softened by the positive effect that 
admitting foreign workers has on the solvency of public pension systems.  While Europe and 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., “Two Amalgamated Worlds,” The Economist, April 3, 2008. 
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Japan have not yet turned to immigration as a way of easing the transition to a future with 
smaller national labor forces, the pension obligations their governments have vis-à-vis coming 
generations of retirees may create an incentive to do so.   
 
5 THE DESIGN OF IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES 
 
 Because immigration may create tension with the functioning of the welfare state, high 
income democratic countries – all of which have welfare systems of one kind or another – may 
resist the unfettered inflow of foreign labor.  One solution to the conflict would be to deny 
immigrants access to welfare benefits, which would allow receiving countries to gain from labor 
inflows while not exacerbating fiscal distortions too severely.  Guest worker programs in part 
serve this purpose.  They grant foreign workers admission visas, while restricting their residency 
rights by placing limits on the amount of time they can spend in the country and the public 
services to which they have access.  Yet, in most countries, guest worker programs remain small.  
In the United States, temporary immigrants accounted for only 3% of the total stock of 
immigrants in the country in 2005 (Camarota, 2005).  In 2006, inflows of legal temporary 
workers were 213,000 in Australia, 146,000 in Canada, 28,000 in France, 295,000 in Germany, 
98,000 in Italy, 164,000 in Japan, 83,000 in the Netherlands, and 266,000 in the United Kingdom 
(OECD, 2008).  Note that given the short term status of guest workers these numbers represents 
stocks and not flows of temporary immigrants (i.e., these populations of workers turn over 
completely every one to three years).   
Interestingly, it is non-democratic countries, including the Gulf States, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore, that appear to channel most of their low-skilled immigrants through guest worker 
programs (Rupert, 1999; Winckler, 1999).  Table 2 shows the stock of immigrants in 2000 in the 
six largest Middle Eastern labor importing countries, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.14  In 2000, immigration in these countries accounted for 
6.4% of the world total and 7.5% of world immigration from low and middle income countries.  
                                                 
14 While immigrants accounts for a large share of the populations of Hong Kong and Singapore, labor inflows into 
these countries are a small share of the world total (with the exception of migration from China to Hong Kong, 
which totals 2.2 million individuals).  In 2000, the number of non-Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong and Singapore 
were just over a half a million individuals in each country (Parsons et al., 2007). 
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Two thirds of the immigration in the six Gulf States comes from just seven sending countries, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen.   
Why would Gulf States be willing to admit large numbers of low skilled immigrants as 
guest workers whereas the United States and Europe effectively force similar labor inflows to be 
illegal?  One conjecture is that non-democratic countries are better able to enforce the departure 
provisions of guest worker contracts (Massey, 2004).  The Gulf States do appear to be aggressive 
in deporting illegal immigrants (Shah, 2006).  Enforcing departure requires immigration 
authorities to be able to monitor the movements of immigrants.   A government cannot deport 
immigrants that violate the terms of their visas unless it can locate them.  Monitoring may be 
aided by the internal surveillance that non-democratic countries maintain as part of their national 
security infrastructure.  Tight internal security may make it difficult for illegal immigrants to 
evade apprehension.  The watchful eye of the government may thus enhance the capability of the 
state to run large scale temporary immigration programs. 
Relative to non-democratic societies, democratic countries are typically less vigilant over 
the movements of individuals.  The protection of civil liberties inherent to democratic societies 
may complicate the internal enforcement of temporary immigration visas (Martin, 2001).   
Concerns over violating civil liberties may impede the state from acquiring information over 
where immigrants live and work.  If immigrants in democratic countries choose to overstay their 
visas and violate the terms of their temporary labor contracts, they often can (Passel, 2006).  One 
consequence of imperfect vigilance in democracies may be that voters are skeptical about the 
ability of governments to force temporary migrants to return home after their labor contracts are 
completed.  Imperfect enforcement of guest worker contracts for low skilled immigrants may 
lead voters to view such programs as simply allowing open ended immigration, causing them to 
have weak political support (Briggs, 2004). 
 How do democratic receiving countries resolve the conflict between the welfare state and 
the need for immigration?  One way is by effectively forcing low skilled foreign workers to enter 
their countries as illegal immigrants.  Illegal immigration gives receiving countries access to the 
labor they desire, while limiting the fiscal consequences of labor inflows.  In the United States, 
illegal immigrants account for 30% of the foreign born population in the country (Passel, 2006).  
Illegal immigration is by no means exclusively a US phenomenon.  For the European Union, 
Jandl (2003) estimates than the gross annual inflow of illegal immigrants is on the order of 
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650,000 to 800,000 individuals a year, which is comparable to gross illegal inflows in the United 
States.  Inflows of this magnitude do not necessarily translate into large stocks of illegal 
immigrants in part because European countries have been aggressive in providing amnesties to 
illegal immigrants.  Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have each offered multiple amnesties, 
which has kept the share of illegals in the region’s foreign born population under 10% (Jandl, 
2003).   
While the United States and Europe devote resources to enforcing their borders against 
illegal immigration, it is evident that these enforcement efforts are not meant to be too effective.  
The United States spends about $15 billion a year on border enforcement efforts and apprehends 
0.8 to 1.2 million individuals attempting to enter the country illegally (Hanson, 2006).  In the 
European Union, there are no official data on spending on border enforcement or on the number 
of illegal immigrants detained but Jandl (2003) suggests that there are at least 0.3 to 0.4 million 
apprehensions of illegal immigrants in EU countries each year.  The United States and Europe 
could easily afford to spend far more on border enforcement but choose not to.  High levels of 
illegal immigration reflect a decision on the part of receiving country governments to allow 
illegal entry to occur.  Illegal immigration is a policy choice.   
 To understand why countries permit both legal and illegal immigration it is helpful to 
review the mechanisms that countries use to govern admissions.  Countries regulate legal 
immigration through a combination of numerical quotas, entry selection criteria, and restrictions 
on residency rights.  While many countries have admission categories that allow unrestricted 
immigration, these are generally limited to immediate family members of citizens, as in the 
United States, or individuals from countries within an economic bloc, as in the European Union.  
Other legal immigrants are subject to quotas, whose number varies according to a nation’s ex 
ante selection criteria.  The United States allocates the majority of permanent residence visas to 
relatives of U.S. citizens and legal residents; Australia and Canada favor legal immigrants that 
meet designated skill criteria; and many European countries reserve a large share of visas for 
refugees and asylees (OECD, 2008).  Visas come with limited residency rights.  Temporary visas 
specify a time limit for residence, the types of jobs a visa holder may hold, and the set of 
government benefits to which the holder has access.  Permanent visas provide broader residency 
rights, such as mobility between employers and access to more government benefits, but do not 
always offer a clear path to citizenship. 
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 Regarding illegal immigration, while countries do not explicitly set unauthorized labor 
inflows, they do implicitly determine the ease of illegal entry through their enforcement actions.  
By choosing the intensity with which they police national borders and monitor domestic 
worksites, governments influence the smuggling fee illegal immigrants pay to enter a country 
(Ethier, 1986; Gathmann, 2004).  Enforcement also defines an ex post selection criterion for 
illegal immigrants:  individuals who are able to evade capture by avoiding the police earn the 
right to stay in the country (Cox and Posner, 2006).  The United States, for instance, concentrates 
enforcement on borders rather than in the interior, allowing most illegal immigrants who do not 
commit crimes or maintain a high public profile to remain on U.S. soil (Davila, Pagan, and Grau, 
1999).  While illegal immigrants lack official residency rights, they are not devoid of legal 
protections.  Again in the United States, illegal immigrants may report crimes, attend public 
schools, seek emergency medical services, obtain bank loans, or even acquire a driver’s license 
(in some states), with minimal risk of deportation. 
 Recently, countries have begun to change the way they approach enforcement against 
illegal immigration.  Beginning in 2006, immigration authorities in the United States 
dramatically increased large scale raids of US worksites and sought to locate immigrants who 
had ignored deportation orders, as a means of increasing enforcement against illegal immigration 
in the US interior (Camarota, 2008).  The government has increased interior enforcement against 
illegal immigration at several points in the past (the early 1950s, 1987, 1994, and 2001), only to 
relax these efforts once economic conditions generated an increase in the demand for labor 
(Hanson, 2006).  With the transition in government from President Bush to President Obama, 
there are signs that the United States will place less emphasis on enforcement against illegal 
immigration in the US interior, returning to the traditional practice of focusing on the border.15 
 For migrants, there are obvious disadvantages associated with high-income countries 
channeling the low skilled through illegal means of entry.  Illegal migration is dangerous, 
subjecting migrants to physical risks associated entry by sea, across deserts, or hidden in 
transport vehicles.  To reduce physical risks, migrants often seek the services of a smuggler, but 
this entails risks of its own associated with robbery or assault.  Once in the destination country, 
being illegal leaves migrants in a state of uncertainty and weakens their ability and incentive to 
make long run investments in their place of residence.  By virtue of their status, illegal 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., http://www.barackobama.com/issues/immigration/.   
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immigrants lack legal recourse and may be apprehensive to seek police or fire protection when 
the situation calls. 
 Cross-country differences in policy regimes do not affect the skill mix of immigrants as 
much as one might think.  Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2003) find that excluding immigrants 
from Latin America – who benefit from close proximity to the United States – the education, 
English fluency, and income of immigrants in Australia, Canada, and the United States are 
relatively similar.  This is true despite Australia’s and Canada’s use of a point system that favors 
skilled immigrants and the US reliance on family reunification, which takes no account of skill, 
for the majority of its admissions.  Comparing immigrants admitted on employment-based visas 
in Australia and the United States, Jasso and Rosenzweig (2007) suggest that it is self-selection, 
rather than national screening mechanisms, which accounts for differences in immigrant skills. 
Even with similarities between countries in who gets in, there are differences within 
countries in how legal and illegal inflows are regulated.  As discussed above, authorized entrants 
tend to be subject to quantity regulation and ex ante selection criteria and have either expansive 
residency rights (for permanent immigrants) or limited residency rights (for temporary 
immigrants); and unauthorized entrants tend to be subject to price regulation and ex post 
selection criteria and have minimal residency rights. 
Why do countries permit both legal and illegal immigration?  First, consider legal 
inflows.  Quantity regulation allows a country to achieve specific goals in admissions, by 
assigning quotas to particular categories.  The allocation of quotas may reflect a desire to 
maximize the immigration surplus (by admitting scarce labor types), political economy 
constraints on the level and type of immigrant inflows, or other objectives of government (e.g., 
national security, cultural homogeneity, humanitarian concerns).  An ex ante screen has a cost in 
that the government foregoes the option to obtain information on an immigrant beyond 
observable characteristics, before offering admission (Cox and Posner, 2006).  However, the cost 
of foregone information may be small for skilled immigrants whose abilities are verifiable in the 
form of educational degrees, professional awards, and past employment positions.  The effective 
information cost may also be small where countries have strong preferences for specific types of 
entrants (e.g., family members), in which case any updating on immigrant quality after residence 
in the country would be unlikely to alter the admission decision.   
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Combining an ex ante screen with broad residency rights gives immigrants a strong 
incentive to assimilate.  However, broad rights have a high fiscal cost, since they give 
immigrants access to government benefits.  The cost of providing broad rights may be small for 
skilled immigrants, whose income-earning ability would make them net contributors to 
government coffers.  For family-based immigrants, the perceived cost of broad rights may also 
be small since, as family members of residents, their well being may be an implicit component of 
national welfare.  For refugees and asylees, a similar logic would not apply, perhaps accounting 
for why they tend to have narrow residency rights (Åslund, Edin, and Fredriksson, 2001; Hatton 
and Williamson, 2004). 
Quotas do not imply as much inflexibility in immigration levels as it would seem, since 
countries often admit a mix of permanent and temporary entrants.  Opponents to immigration 
may be unwilling to allow all entrants be permanent.  Temporary immigration quotas give 
politicians the power to rescind visas in the future, which may increase support for immigration.  
The cost of having immigrants be temporary is a weak incentive to assimilate.  Comparing the 
costs and benefits, we might expect the share of temporary immigrants in legal admissions to be 
higher when an economy is closer to a business cycle peak, at which point the option value of 
being able to expel current entrants in the future may be relatively high. 
Constitutional rules governing citizenship may constrain legal immigration policy 
regimes.  Countries allow individuals to acquire citizenship by birth, naturalization or marriage.  
Under the jus soli principle, which is rooted in both civil and common law traditions, citizenship 
is acquired by place of birth, implying the native-born child of an immigrant is a citizen.  Under 
the jus sanguinis principle, citizenship is acquired by descent, such that the child of a citizen is 
also a citizen, regardless of birthplace.  Current citizenship laws often embody both principles, 
though they tend to have emerged out of one tradition or the other.   Jus soli was predominant in 
Europe through the 18th century, given feudal traditions linking citizenship to land.  The French 
adopted jus sanguinis in the early 19th century, which then spread throughout continental Europe 
and its colonies.  The United Kingdom, however, preserved jus soli, which was adopted by the 
United States, Canada, and Australia (Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2006).  Under a jus sanguinis 
tradition, a country may have difficulty in granting broad residency rights to immigrants whose 
parents were not citizens, as appears to be the case in France. 
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Source country policies may also affect which immigrants become naturalized in 
destination countries.  During the 1990s, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
and Ecuador each enacted laws permitting dual citizenship.  Mazzolari (2005) finds that between 
1990 and 2000 U.S. naturalization rates for eligible immigrants from these countries increased 
relative to immigrants from other countries, suggesting that not having to give up citizenship in 
the source may speed assimilation in the destination. 
 For illegal immigration, entry prices and selection criteria are defined implicitly through 
the intensity of border and interior enforcement (Either, 1986).  Entry prices serve as selection 
device, since an individual must value migration to be willing to incur the cost of paying a 
smuggler.  Entry fees thus select immigrants with large perceived income gains (Orrenius and 
Zavodny, 2001), which would include those for whom immigration would yield large gains in 
either pre-tax income (due to a productivity gain from immigration) or post-tax income (due to 
tax and transfer policies in the destination).  While most destination countries would prefer to 
attract the first type of immigrant over the second, an entry price does not select between the 
two. 
One way to encourage immigration of more productive illegal immigrants is through 
granting narrow residency rights.  For instance, since 1996 non-citizens in the United States have 
been ineligible for most types of federally funded public assistance (Fix and Passel, 2002).  A 
second way is through ex post screening.  Interior enforcement helps screen out illegal 
immigrants who commit crimes, try to obtain government benefits illicitly, or engage in other 
behavior deemed objectionable.  Governments that choose not to monitor employers that hire 
illegal immigrants can ensure that illegals who come to work are able remain in the country.  In 
the United States, greater border enforcement does not appear to have strong deterrent effects on 
illegal entry (Davila, Pagan, and Soydemir, 2002) or to affect wages or employment in U.S. 
border cities (Hanson, Robertson, and Spilimbergo, 2001), suggesting that the primary role of 
enforcement is not to disrupt U.S. labor markets. 
Combining price regulation, narrow residency rights, and an ex post screen helps 
countries attract productive and motivated illegal immigrants.  This selection process may be 
particularly important for the low-skilled, whose observable characteristics may be 
uninformative about their productivity.  In the United States, two-thirds of immigrants with less 
than a high school education appear to be in the country illegally (Passel, 2006), suggesting that 
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the majority of the least skilled immigrants are unauthorized.  Relative to similarly skilled 
natives, low-skill immigrants have high employment rates and low rates of participation in crime 
(Butcher and Piehl, 1998 and 2006). 
 The United States and the EU have considered using expanded temporary immigration to 
absorb their illegal immigrant populations (Walmsley and Winters, 2005; Schiff, 2007).  Large 
scale illegal entry in the United States began after the end of the Bracero Program (1942-1964), 
which admitted large numbers of seasonal laborers from Mexico and the Caribbean to work on 
U.S. farms (Calavita, 1992).  Could new guest worker programs end illegal inflows?  Recent 
literature suggests that unless interior enforcement is highly effective at preventing employers 
from hiring illegals, a guest worker program that rations entry would not curtail the employment 
of unauthorized labor but simply push these workers deeper into the underground economy 
(Djajic, 1999; Epstein, Hillman, and Weiss, 1999; Epstein and Weiss, 2001). 
 
 The emergence of large scale illegal immigration in the United States and Europe can be 
seen as the result of a conflict between a desire to allow immigration of low skilled individuals 
(most of whom are from low income countries) and a desire to maintain a significant welfare 
state.  The mechanisms that govern illegal immigration select individuals with a strong 
motivation to work and restrict their access to government benefits.  The advantage of such a 
system is that it subjects illegal immigration to market forces, producing a level of immigration 
and a composition of immigrants that reflect relative economic opportunities in sending and 
receiving countries.  In practice, illegal immigration appears to be more flexible and more 
responsive to economic conditions than legal immigration. 
 Yet, there would appear to be clear disadvantages to illegal immigration.  It creates a 
class of individuals with poorly defined residency rights, who, in the absence of occasional 
amnesties, lack legal protection.  The presence of a large group of individuals living without 
official status may undermine civil society in receiving countries by weakening democratic 
norms and reducing the incentive of politicians to respond to the needs of their constituents 
(Huntington, 2004).  The uncertain tenure of illegal immigrants may reduce their incentive to 
make long run investments in the receiving country, preventing some productivity gains from 
being realized.  Allowing illegal immigration creates the incentive for entry by criminal gangs, 
who offer smuggling services but may subject prospective migrants to the risk of abuse (Martin 
 26
and Miller, 2000).  The challenge to policy makers is to design an immigration regime that has 
the appealing efficiency properties of illegal immigration – in terms of its flexibility and 
screening mechanisms – but lacks the negative consequences for the rule of law in receiving 
countries and the physical security of migrants. 
 
6 DISCUSSION 
 
 In a neoclassical economy, the optimal immigration policy would be to allow the 
unfettered entry of labor from abroad.  Yet, labor-importing countries tightly restrict labor 
inflows.  Barriers to immigration in part reflect domestic political opposition to open borders, 
with those most opposed to labor inflows being the workers and taxpayers who are most exposed 
to the adverse consequences of immigration on labor markets and fiscal accounts.  Immigration 
barriers may also represent a second-best policy that governments adopt in order not to 
exacerbate distortions associated with domestic social-insurance programs that they are 
unwilling to dismantle. 
 The structure of immigration policy regimes suggests that destination countries also use 
barriers to identify individuals who appear likely to be productive workers and/or have the desire 
to assimilate.  Reserving immigration visas for skilled workers selects high ability foreigners in a 
transparent manner.  Restricting the residency rights of immigrants helps screen out those whose 
primary interest is in enjoying rich-country welfare benefits.  Less transparently, barriers to 
illegal immigration also select the more productive and more motivated workers among the low-
skilled, whose ability is hard to observe.  The existence of informational problems in evaluating 
immigrants’ abilities and motivations suggests there may be gains from coordination between 
labor-exporting and labor-importing countries.  Were labor-importing countries to have access to 
better information on the employment histories of low-skilled individuals in developing 
countries, they might be willing to accept them in larger numbers and require fewer of them to 
enter their economies as illegal immigrants. 
 There would appear to be strong efficiency arguments for having high income countries 
admit more immigrants.  Their unwillingness to do so reflects an estimation that the gains from 
higher immigration are not worth the political and fiscal costs.  There would also appear to be 
efficiency gains associated with converting illegal immigrants into legal immigrants.  Legality 
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would reduce the uncertainty and physical risk that are inherent to unauthorized migration, 
increase the incentive of migrants to make investments in human or physical capital, diminish 
the scope for criminal gangs to capture a portion of the gains to migration, and strengthen the 
rule of law in receiving countries.  The challenge in converting illegal immigrants into legal 
immigrants – in terms of maintaining domestic political support for such a policy – is avoiding 
making fiscal distortions in receiving countries worse. 
Given the absence of an incentive for receiving countries to participate in multilateral 
negotiations on immigration barriers, efforts to reform immigration policies will have to come 
from receiving countries themselves.  What measures would encourage individuals and 
governments in receiving countries to accept higher levels of legal immigration from low income 
countries? 
 
• Have employers internalize the fiscal cost of hiring immigrant workers. 
One source of opposition to immigration is that it results in a net fiscal transfer from 
native households to immigrant households, at least in cases where immigrants have low income 
levels relative to natives (under the assumption that the receiving country tax system is 
progressive).  Low skilled immigration thus imposes a negative pecuniary externality on native 
taxpayers in the form of a higher net tax burden.  Employers in receiving countries would make 
efficient choices regarding the employment of immigrant workers if they had to internalize the 
fiscal cost.  One mechanism for internalization is a payroll tax that is specific to immigrant 
workers.  It is likely that the incidence of the payroll tax would fall largely on labor, in which 
case lower wages for foreign workers would reflect their true productivity in receiving countries.  
The tax would be set to reflect the number of family members coming with an immigrant 
employee. 
Establishing an immigrant payroll tax would create a two tiered payroll tax structure, one 
for native workers and one for immigrant workers.  There is precedence for separate taxation of 
foreign labor in how temporary foreign workers are currently treated.  Immigrants would convert 
to the native tax system upon naturalization.   
The revenues from immigrant payroll taxes could be divided among local and national 
governments, according to which entities incur the marginal cost of providing public services to 
immigrants.  In this way, local governments would not have an incentive to impede immigration, 
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as they have attempted to do in many parts of the United States (through restrictions on the 
hiring and housing illegal immigrants). 
A payroll tax on immigrant workers may be unappealing on equity grounds, given these 
individuals have low incomes and are often among the most marginal members of society in 
destination countries.  My argument is that a payroll tax of this type would generate increased 
political support for immigration of low skilled labor.  While the welfare of existing immigrants 
would likely decline, there would be large welfare gains for the additional individuals who were 
able to become migrants.  There thus may be a tradeoff in terms of the welfare of existing 
migrants and the welfare of potential migrants.  Of course, one might prefer that high-income 
countries simply lower their immigration barriers and absorb whatever fiscal costs this might 
entail.  However, political realities suggest such an outcome is extremely unlikely.   
 
• Create an incentive for employers to hire legal immigrants.  
To convert current and future illegal immigrants into legal immigrants requires changing 
the incentives for employers in receiving countries.  For employers, one key change is ending 
their ability to hire illegal immigrants under the guise of legal employment, as currently occurs in 
the United States.  This could be achieved by having a national identification card, as exists in 
some European countries, or by imposing a mandatory verification system for employment 
eligibility.  The United States has developed an electronic system known as E-Verify, in which 
prospective employees have their documents checked against a government database.  As it 
stands, verification is mandatory only for government contractors and a few select types of other 
firms.  Making electronic verification mandatory for all firms would end the ability of employers 
to plausibly deny that they have knowingly hired illegal immigrants.  Verification would make 
monitoring of employers a much more significant deterrent against violating employment 
regulations.  Of course, mandatory verification of employment eligibility would not curtail 
employment of illegal immigrants in all sectors.  Enforcing employment practices by households 
and small firms would be very costly.  Employment of illegal immigrants in the home and in 
small firms would likely continue, with housecleaning, child care, yard care, home renovation, 
and small scale construction being among the sectors where employment of illegal immigration 
would be hardest to root out.  Still, mandatory verification would dramatically reduce the 
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incentive to hire illegal immigrants in medium and large firms, which account for most 
employment. 
A second key change is making employment visas available in sufficient quantity.  One 
appeal of hiring illegal immigrants is that they are available immediately, with their numbers 
fluctuating over the course of the business cycle.  One way to make visas responsive to market 
conditions is to auction their supply (Freeman, 2006).  Were governments to set a target price for 
visas, they could vary the supply to keep the visa price relatively constant.  Specifying visas for a 
given length, say, one, two, or three years, would ensure that governments had the ability to raise 
or lower the total number of visas in circulation.  Workers and employers would be free to 
determine how they divide the cost of the visa.  Employment contracts would be required to 
specify the price at which a worker could “purchase” his or her visa from an employer in the 
event the worker wanted to change jobs before the visa had expired.  The sale of visas would 
generate revenue for receiving countries, transferring a portion of the gains from migration from 
migrants to the host country.  Capturing these gains would encourage receiving countries to raise 
immigration of low skilled individuals beyond current levels. 
While auctioning visas might appear to be a significant change in how receiving 
countries govern legal immigration, recall that regimes governing illegal immigration are already 
price regulated.  Smugglers charge fees to migrants to enter receiving countries illegally, with the 
fee reflecting demand for entry (rising during relative boom periods in the receiving country) and 
the cost of illegal crossing (rising during periods of more intense border enforcement by the 
receiving country).  Auctioning visas would allow receiving countries to capture revenues 
currently enjoyed by smugglers.  Migrants would go from paying smugglers a fee for an 
uncertain entry outcome to paying a fee for a certain entry outcome, arguably improving their 
welfare even if the entry price rises. 
 
• Create an incentive for migrants to work as legal employees. 
For migrants, the imposition of a payroll tax and the auctioning of visas could create an 
incentive for them to eschew legal employment and seek work in the underground economy as 
unauthorized employees.  While mandatory verification and monitoring of employers would 
dissuade many firms from hiring illegal immigrants, not all firms would be deterred.  Migrants 
would also need incentives to operate in the legal economy.  One incentive is the promise of 
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permanent residence and citizenship.  Suppose that migrants could accumulate points toward 
obtaining a permanent residence visa by obtaining and completing satisfactorily a series of 
temporary employment visas.  Migrants would have an incentive to comply with the 
requirements of a temporary visa if they wanted to get their visa renewed at the end of the visa 
period.  These requirements would include working in the receiving country only with a valid 
employment visa, paying all relevant payroll taxes, and not using public services for which 
temporary immigrants are ineligible (e.g., in the United States, non-citizens are ineligible for 
federally funded income support payments).  After a specified number of temporary visa 
renewals, an immigrant would be eligible for permanent residence and, after a specified waiting 
period, citizenship, brining full residency rights.  Such a system of graduated residency rights 
(going from an initial temporary visa to a renewed temporary visa to permanent residence to 
citizenship) would provide a strong incentive for migrants to play by the rules.  Citizenship 
would be conditional on behavior.  Illegal migrants would progress from the current environment 
of vague promises of permanent residence in return for their working hard and staying out of 
trouble to a system where the rewards to compliance are well defined and subject to low risk. 
Of course, to make such as system work receiving countries would have to be willing to 
steadily expand the supply of permanent residence visas.  Their incentive for doing so would be 
the revenue generated by auctioning visas and collecting payroll taxes on temporary immigrants 
and the reduction of illegal immigration. 
  
• Create screening mechanisms for low skilled immigrant workers. 
One of the appealing features of illegal immigration is that it attracts individuals with a 
strong desire to work.  By virtue of having to pay an entry fee and not having access to a safety 
net, illegal immigrants are highly motivated to stay employed.  The challenge for policy makers 
is to replicate these features through a system of legal migration.  One way to accomplish this 
would be by allowing international employment agencies to matching workers in sending 
countries with employers in receiving countries.  Employment agencies would serve as 
intermediaries, obtaining information on the skill profile and work history of prospective 
migrants and the occupational requirements of employers.  Employment agencies have come to 
play a large role in domestic hiring by firms in high income countries, particularly the United 
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States (Autor, 2008).  In the Philippines, such agencies help place workers in construction jobs in 
Gulf States and domestic service jobs in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
The active market for illegal labor in the United States and Europe may have reduced the 
scope for legal intermediaries.  Since legal intermediaries risk fines or imprisonment by taking 
illegal immigrants as clients, their incentive to enter the market is limited.  Perhaps as a 
consequence, employers primarily use informal networks to find workers, relying on their 
employees to recruit friends and relatives from sending countries (Massey et al., 1994).  Such 
networks serve a useful purpose but by their nature are small in scale.  Converting illegal 
immigrants into legal immigrants would potentially increase the demand for formal 
intermediaries to help employers find workers abroad. 
Screening mechanisms should not rely on sending countries to be gatekeepers for 
emigration.  Were sending country governments given the power to select which individuals 
would obtain visas to work abroad, the incentive for corruption would be great.  Initially, the 
Bracero Program had the Mexican government allocating visas to migrants to work in the United 
States (Calavita, 1992).  Rampant corruption and abuse of workers put an end to this.  U.S. 
employers then began to contract directly with Mexican workers (often using their own recruiters 
to find field hands). 
This is one argument against attempting to regulate migration through bilateral 
agreements.  What exactly would sending country governments bring to the table in such an 
arrangement?  It is difficult to imagine that they would have access to information about workers 
that destination country employers would value.  It is also difficult to see why they would have a 
desire to regulate migration in a manner that helped emigrants.  If emigrants cease to be voters 
by virtue of leaving, sending country governments may have weak incentives to be responsive to 
their interests.  Further, to the extent they would exercise control over the supply of labor, 
sending country governments would have an incentive to attempt to appropriate the gains to 
migration from migrants.  Migrants would likely be better offer if they were free to enter into 
labor contracts with employers in destination countries, without requiring the approval of the 
sending country.  
Allowing more labor to move from low income countries to high income countries would 
raise world income, generating gains for migrants, migrant family members in sending countries, 
and receiving countries.  Receiving countries remain unenthusiastic about immigration because 
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they enjoy, at best, small net gains from international labor flows.  Migrants capture much of the 
gains from international migration.  Whatever benefits that remain for receiving countries are 
partially or fully negated by worsening fiscal distortions.  Unless receiving countries perceive 
greater benefits from immigration, they will not be inclined to allow more labor in.   
Multilateral negotiations hold little hope for expanding labor flows.  At least as far as 
migration is concerned, receiving countries have all the bargaining power.  Reciprocal market 
access for migration to poor sending countries is simply not much of an attraction for the United 
States or Europe.  The WTO itself acknowledges that GATS Mode IV has been ineffective at 
increasing global labor flows (IOM/World Bank/WTO, Mamdouh, 2004).  Making Mode IV a 
meaningful vehicle for migration would appear to require governments to substantially liberalize 
their commitments on labor movements associated with trade in services.  High-income 
countries do not appear to have made this a priority in their approach to negotiations surrounding 
the Doha Round (Charlton and Stiglitz, 2005).  Conceivably, low-income countries could 
demand progress on expanding Mode IV as grounds for completing Doha.  Given the existing 
conflicts and controversy surrounding the negotiations, it is difficult to see how such an approach 
would make completing the round more likely. 
Fortunately, there are changes that receiving countries could undertake themselves that 
would encourage the lowering of immigration barriers.  The fiscal costs of immigration could be 
reduced by subjecting immigrant workers to payroll taxes and by auctioning visas to temporary 
immigrant workers.  With more visas available and in flexible supply, the incentive for illegal 
migration would fall.  Sensible monitoring of employers could further reduce the hiring of illegal 
labor.  Migrants could also gain from such reforms, to the extent they obtained a clearly defined 
path to citizenship and were able to escape the risk uncertainty of unauthorized migration.  New 
individuals in low income countries could possibly gain access to emigration opportunities.  
Simply stated, unless they perceive larger benefits to immigration, receiving countries are 
unlikely to open their borders. 
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   Table 1    
 Stocks of International Migrants by Origin and Destination Region, 2000  
  Destination Region 
Origin Region High Income Other Asia  
Latin Am. & 
Car. 
Eastern 
Europe 
Former Soviet 
Union 
Middle East 
& N. Africa
Sub Saharan 
Africa Total 
High Income 21,155,815 1,149,869 2,036,010 553,633 478,763 1,246,442 772,836 27,393,368 
Other Asia  15,266,768 18,104,219 174,503 126,806 368,003 9,397,668 411,041 43,849,008 
Latin America & Car. 21,453,599 622,774 3,575,082 60,829 249,683 452,855 237,676 26,652,498 
Eastern Europe 6,913,603 198,836 79,468 1,689,382 832,362 1,269,960 162,681 11,146,292 
Former Soviet Union 2,252,041 674,546 69,594 1,650,766 24,553,428 1,612,173 411,628 31,224,176 
Mid. East & N. Africa 9,161,003 461,413 93,889 276,559 247,622 7,118,225 531,322 17,890,033 
Sub Saharan Africa 3,901,407 302,209 41,135 63,436 138,666 798,755 12,307,038 17,552,646 
Total 80,104,236 21,513,866 6,069,681 4,421,411 26,868,527 21,896,078 14,834,222 175,708,021
         
 International Migrants by Origin and Destination Region as Share of World Total, 2000  
  Destination Region 
Origin Region High Income Other Asia  
Latin Am. & 
Car. 
Eastern 
Europe 
Former Soviet 
Union 
Middle East 
& N. Africa
Sub Saharan 
Africa Total 
High Income 0.120 0.007 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.156 
Other Asia  0.087 0.103 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.053 0.002 0.250 
Latin America & Car. 0.122 0.004 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.152 
Eastern Europe 0.039 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.063 
Former Soviet Union 0.013 0.004 0.000 0.009 0.140 0.009 0.002 0.178 
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Mid. East & N. Africa 0.052 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.041 0.003 0.102 
Sub Saharan Africa 0.022 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.070 0.100 
  0.456 0.122 0.035 0.025 0.153 0.125 0.084 1.000 
High income includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand; Canada, the United States; Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom.  Data are from Parsons et al. (2007). 
 Table 2:  International Migration to Arab Gulf States, 2000  
Origin Countries Bahrain Jordan Kuwait Oman Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia 
United 
Arab 
Emirates Total 
Other Asia 191,059 848,149 395,614 580,034 409,388 2,929,055 1,485,422 6,838,721  
Indonesia      296,778 13,098 355,955  
Philippines      383,031 18,551 486,521  
Bangladesh    111,968  379,207 24,041 614,611  
India 146,512 362,591 219,184 341,342 409,388 1,045,985 1,299,439 3,824,441  
Pakistan      661,383  881,854  
         
Middle East, N. Africa 30,797 516,591 87,011 72,538 0 1,967,811 214,235 2,888,983  
Yemen      360,438  424,900  
Egypt  127,018    1,015,124  1,248,258  
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High Income 4,469 134,300 147,698 12,308 0 53,643 51,441 403,859  
Eastern Europe 1,424 120,194 58,854 756 0 1,266 46,039 228,533  
Former Soviet Union 18,393 177,372 179,148 2,329 0 1,865 67,941 447,048  
Latin America, Caribbean 2,884 74,713 152,289 182 0 785 28,619 259,472  
Sub Saharan Africa 5,281 73,897 87,060 13,574 0 300,387 28,304 508,503  
         
Total 254,307 1,945,216 1,107,674 681,721 409,388 5,254,812 1,922,001 11,575,119  
 
This table shows the stock of immigrants in Gulf States by sending region and for the largest sending countries.  Data are from 
Parsons et al. (2007). 
